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‘The Role of Lawyers, Judges, Country Experts and officials in British Asylum and 
Immigration Law’1 
 
In this paper I examine two key issues. First, using a diverse range of legal cases I examine 
the work of lawyers, judges and ‘country experts’ involved in asylum and migration litigation 
in the United Kingdom. Secondly, following Galanter (1974: 95-96), I step back from 
specific cases to ascertain ‘under what conditions can litigation be redistributive, taking 
litigation in the broadest sense of the presentation of claims to be decided by courts (or court-
like agencies) and the whole penumbra of threats, feints, and so forth’.  
The background to this paper arises from the fact that the British government has 
consistently categorized ‘foreigners’ as ethnically and racially different from the host 
population and has used this rhetoric to justify its exclusion of members of the British 
Commonwealth, migrants and asylum-seekers and others from entering the UK (Geddes  
2003; Bosworth, Parmar & Vázquez 2018). This paper will show, however, that the 
supposedly ‘bright line’ set out in the law to differentiate between the rights of citizens and 
non-nationals (Dauvergne 2004: 590-591) has become increasingly blurred due to changes in 
legislation and the discretionary decisions of officials which have created numerous 
ambiguities and contradictions regarding the legal status of ‘foreigners’. It is litigation against 
some of these ambiguities which is explored below. 
The first section of this paper discusses the research on which this article is based. 
Section (ii) argues that asylum and immigration law and practice constitute a ‘semi-
autonomous social field’ within which is situated a number of diverse institutions, 
 
1 I gratefully acknowledge comments from two anonymous reviewers which have greatly 
improved the paper. 
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organizations and actors that shape policy and determine the outcome of legal appeals/ 
litigation. To illustrate how the asylum field works, section (iii) examines four different types 
of legal claims which have been litigated in the courts between the mid-1990s and 2019. As 
the cases show, there is a strong continuity in the way that institutions and actors perform 
their distinctive, interlinked roles in the ‘asylum field’ which is dominated by the British 
Home Office (HO) and, to a lesser extent, the judiciary. While politicians legislate and 
officials implement policies, immigration barristers challenge policy and/or how policies are 
implemented, country experts provide evidence for specific appeals against the government, 
and the judiciary tends to suture over potential fractures in the law by interpreting ‘facts’ and 
relying on precedent to ensure legal and political stability (Latour 2010). In this way the 
asylum field functions over time to uphold the legitimacy of state policy to exclude 
‘foreigners’, while simultaneously granting a small number of asylum applicants protection 
and some foreign nationals the right to legally enter and reside in the UK.  
FIELDWORK IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
This paper draws on two years of in-depth ethnographic fieldwork (between 2007-
2009), a considerable amount of subsequent research, and twenty-five years of my work as a 
‘country expert’ (between 1994-2019) writing ‘expert reports’ for asylum seekers and 
migrants and providing oral testimony in legal appeals (cf. Good 2004). With some 
exceptions (see work cited below), most research on asylum has been prescriptive – i.e. it 
focuses on specific laws, reforms or cases – and has failed to set out a wide picture of how 
the asylum system is organized and operated. For the most part research has not sought to 
understand the role and interplay of key institutions in the system.  
While considerable research has focused on litigation in specific appeals, it has tended 
to criticize how cases were decided and has failed to examine the inter-connected roles of 
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‘country experts’, lawyers, judges and government officials involved in litigation. In short, 
most research at the time and, to a certain extent even now, tends to focus on narrowly 
defined issues and fails to appreciate how the British asylum system constrains the 
possibilities of legal challenge and reform. To overcome such a limited understanding, I have 
relied on the work of Moore (1973/74) which has enabled me to see the asylum system as a 
legal arena or ‘semi-autonomous social field’. 
Accordingly, I have followed asylum-related litigation in the First Tier Tribunal 
(FTT, Immigration and Asylum), the Upper Tribunal (UT, Immigration and Asylum 
Chamber) and in the English Court of Appeal (CoA). I have followed asylum and migration 
claims as they moved between the Home Office, law offices and the court and I have 
collected and analysed information on a large number of different kinds of appeals. 
Fieldwork has allowed me to understand how legal claims are taken (by Home Office 
officials and refugee lawyers), interpreted, translated into the law, argued in court by 
barristers and decided by Judges (Campbell 2017). 
Fieldwork was also conducted in immigration law firms and barristers’ chambers as 
well as in two departments of the United Kingdom’s Visas & Immigration Department, the 
Government Legal Department and in eight national refugee organizations, forty NGOs and 
eleven refugee community organizations. Fieldwork involved participant observation in many 
different settings including courts and law offices; I took verbatim notes of appeals, accessed 
case files, analysed documents and interviewed asylum applicants, lawyers, barristers and 
officials.  
A focus on litigation has allowed me to identify and understand the work of all the 
institutions whose activities are focused on determining the outcome of individual legal 
claims and, directly and indirectly, influencing asylum and immigration policy. In this sense, 
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litigation has provided me with a means of understanding how specific actors located in 
different institutions in this social field perform their tasks, and the manner in which legal 
cases are constructed and argued by the parties involved in the claim. However, my 
ethnographic research looks beyond individual claims and situates and analyses them as part 
of the broader political processes at work in the asylum field.  
Research was vetted and approved by my institution, funded by the UK’s Economic 
and Social Research Council and was overseen by an Advisory Board. The purpose of the 
research was explained to everyone – sometimes by myself, my research officer or by 
research assistants/interpreters – and informants were asked to sign consent forms authorising 
me to use the information they provided.  
With respect to as ‘every day ethics’ or ‘micro-ethics’ (Tomkinson 2015) which arose 
during fieldwork, we sometimes found it necessary to advise and/or assist asylum seekers2 
and sometimes what was required was to listen to their stories and empathize with their 
situation. However, because we were not undertaking a longitudinal study of asylum-seekers 
we did not experience intensive and complex relationships with informants which might have 
required a more complex ‘multi-layered’ approach to their needs (Vervliet, Rousseau & 
Derluyn 2015). In contrast, my work as a country expert was commissioned directly by an 
asylum-applicants solicitor; I had no contact with individual applicants unless I attended 
court to provide oral testimony in their appeals. 
THE FIELD OF ASYLUM AND IMMIGRATION LAW 
 
2 We paid destitute asylum-seekers a small cash honorarium for allowing us to interview 
them.  
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 Fieldwork revealed that there are a number of institutions which directly shape the 
asylum field, but which are normally seen as operating outside the asylum field. For instance, 
in Parliament elected politicians review, debate and pass legislation that fundamentally 
shapes asylum and immigration law and the way the entire field functions. At one remove 
from Parliament is the Home Office (HO) which is the central institution in the asylum 
system. This Department, overseen by the Secretary of State for the Home Office (SSHD), is 
part of the executive branch of the state. The Secretary of State, an elected politician, is 
responsible for immigration and asylum policy as well as the administration of the HO and its 
operational wings the United Kingdom Visas & Immigration Department, the Border Force 
and Immigration Enforcement. In addition to implementing legislation, the SSHD creates law 
and policy by introducing new and secondary legislation (Clayton and Firth 2018, Sec. 1).  
Cabinet decisions and decisions taken by the SSHD are communicated to staff in the 
HO via discussions with senior officials in the ‘Policy Development Group’ before being 
transmitted downwards to a plethora of officials who are expected to implement them. 
Crucially policy making in the HO is an intensely insulated process which results in policies 
and decisions that are frequently in tension with domestic and international law including the 
1951 Refugee Convention (Duvell & Jordan 2003; Consterdine 2013; Campbell 2016). 
Each institution – including law firms, barrister chambers, NGOs, the Chief Inspector 
of the Borders, UNHCR, the courts and so – and the individuals who work in them, pursue a 
range of projects/agendas focused on asylum and migration law. The situation can be 
understood in two complementary ways. For instance, Conley & O’Barr (1998: 89) have 
observed that ‘the entity we call the law manifests itself in the behaviour of legal 
officials …Because these are real people, their orientations and reactions are not uniform, but 
rather vary in interesting ways’ as they seek to influence the outcome of a case. At the same 
time, Bourdieu’s (1987: 817) conception of the ‘juridical field’ aptly describes litigation. He 
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argues that the ‘juridical field’ ‘is the site of competition for monopoly of the right to 
determine the law’. Whereas Bourdieu focuses on ‘the socially recognized capacity to 
interpret a corpus of texts’, I envisage legal contests as playing out in a much wider political 
field, though I share his view that the actors involved, most of whom see themselves as 
‘lawyers’ (whether or not they actually practice law), exhibit  a clearly identifiable habitus 
reflecting a set of ingrained habits, skills, and dispositions which they pursue via ‘a single 
minded pursuit of their client’s interests’ (Rostain 2004: 153). 
 Fieldwork examined the work of Home Office case workers who process and decide 
initial claims/applications. Their work is directly affected by HO policies and instructions and 
by bureaucratic processes, e.g. the imposition of management targets requiring quick 
decisions, the quality of their training and so on which result in decisions which are 
challenged by judicial review (see case three and four, below). Legal challenges against 
official decisions occur at all stages of the asylum process.3 
Litigation, which for the purpose of this paper includes asylum appeals and Judicial 
Reviews (JR’s) against official decisions, provides information about the issues raised in a 
claim and it allows me to analyse the work of institutional and individual actors. The work of 
institutions is revealed in the legal and policy issues raised in a claim, including behind-the-
scenes work to influence how a claim is decided. Furthermore, an examination of cases 
reveals how the government litigates to secure compliance with its objectives (even though 
litigation often fails to achieve a specific objective; Campbell 2017, Chap. 6). 
 
3 Typically, ninety percent of initial asylum applications are refused by Home Office 
caseworkers, though between one-quarter and one-third of their decisions are overturned on 
appeal.  
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 Private immigration caseworkers/solicitors work in tandem with ‘interpreters’ in a law 
firm to prepare an application for asylum and the legal appeal against the HO’s refusal to 
grant protection. Due to the complexity of asylum and migration law, applicants have little 
chance of securing status without legal assistance. In effect lawyers and interpreters (in the 
UK interpreters are barred from offering legal advice) function as ‘gatekeepers’ who can 
facilitate or stymie a legal claim (James & Killick 2012).  
Furthermore, given the asymmetrical nature of all interviews, especially those 
conducted by the Home Office, limited access to a lawyer, and difficulties in bridging 
cultural and linguistic differences between applicants and British actors, the ‘translation’ of 
an asylum applicant’s account and its ‘entextualization’ into documents written in English 
which are submitted to the court can easily damage the credibility of applicants and 
undermine their claim (Crawley 2010; Blommaert 2001; Gibb & Good 2014; Jacquemet 
2009). 
Lawyers, judges, Home Office officials and interpreters ‘manipulate the discourse’ of 
law to shape, redefine, redirect and argue a dispute.4 Indeed, Mather and Yngvesson argue 
that disputing should ‘be viewed as a bargaining process in which the object of the dispute, 
and the normative framework to be applied, are negotiated as the dispute proceeds’ (1980/81: 
818). They note that is common for lawyers to narrow the focus, restrict or exclude 
participation in the dispute beyond the immediate parties, and adopt a highly specialized form 
 
4 Good (2004: 131) notes: ‘The key point seems to be that lawyers take matters which have 
been established to the appropriate standard of proof to be true facts, in an absolute sense, and 
judges see their task as deciding how the law should properly be applied to those facts, 
whereas for anthropologists ‘facts’ are always products of a particularly theoretical approach, 
and truth is at best provisional and contested.’ 
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of discourse which prevents disputants from participating in the case. This aptly describes the 
nature of asylum/immigration litigation in the UK. 
 ‘Country Experts’ provide ‘evidence’5 addressing key elements of an individual’s 
asylum claim to the judiciary, a process that enhances the legitimacy of the legal process. In 
asylum and immigration law these ‘expert witnesses’ are identified and instructed by legal 
counsel for individual appellants and can be selected from the fields of medicine6, law, 
anthropology, history, linguistics or journalism. The key issue in choosing an expert to is 
whether s/he possesses sufficient ‘cultural expertise’ in the form of an in-depth knowledge of 
the appellant’s country of origin, his/her language or culture, their medical condition or 
foreign law, and whether the expert can provide a persuasive view of the issues raised by the 
case (Jones 1994; Goodwin 1994).  
Following Holden (2019) it is important to note that experts can play very different 
roles – and sometimes no role at all – in common law and civil law traditions and in different 
legal jurisdictions (e.g. asylum, family and criminal law, native land claims etc.). Indeed, in 
British asylum law country experts provide cultural and/or legal evidence (see case one, 
below) or assume an interstitial role7 between different legal jurisdictions to interpret foreign 
law and practice (see case two, below). 
Most experts find that judges sceptically view their evidence/testimony and often 
reject, reinterpret or instrumentalize their findings. This problem arises because, regardless of 
 
5 Anthropologists tend to define the nature of their  ‘evidence’ as ‘cultural’ (Engelke  2008; 
Good 2008).  
6 Good (2007) has described the limited role of medical experts/expertise in British asylum. 
7 The Concise Oxford Dictionary (1999) defines interstitial as an adjective, ‘of, forming or 
occupying interstices.’  
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their training or area of claimed expertise, an expert’s standing in asylum law is limited to  
providing hearsay or opinion evidence.8 In addition, Judge’s use the court’s Procedural Rules 
and Directions to decide how much weight, if any, to attach to an expert’s ‘evidence’ 
(Campbell 2017, Chap. 5). In this sense, the power of judges to control/regulate experts is a 
reflection of their ‘professional vision’, i.e. their habitus or situated perspective which 
emerges from professional socialisation, training and court room practice. This ‘vision’ 
reinforces their power to accept, reject or modify the evidence before them and reflects their 
view of the case and relevant law (Jones 1994; Goodwin 1994).9  
Anthropologists who are country experts are normally asked to assess an applicant’s 
claims about political conditions in their country of origin, including the possibility that they 
may be at risk of persecution for a Convention reason if s/he is ‘returned’ to their country of 
origin. Anthropologists have typically responded to their perceived subordination to judges in 
one of three ways.10 First, in response to accusations that experts are biased/lack objectivity, 
some argue that the legal process forces them ‘to submit to the hegemony of the judiciary’ 
and that anthropologists are trained ‘to think differently’ than lawyers (Good 2004: 129). 
Other anthropologists argue that lawyers operate with different epistemological premises to 
 
8 Rules regulating opinion evidence are intended to limit permissible evidence in order to 
limit bias and to allow judges the freedom to arrive at a ‘reasoned’ decision. 
9 As Rosen (1979: 111-112) has noted of expert evidence, ‘in a court of law their concepts 
may take on significance far beyond the limits of their intention or their initial inquiry, and 
the implications of their testimony may go far beyond anything they had seen’. In this sense, 
an expert’s evidence will have been ‘given an entirely different valence; they are 
instrumentalized’ (Riles 2006: 62).  
10 Only a small number of anthropologist’s act as experts in legal proceedings. 
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anthropology which can create serious ethical dilemmas, and which requires them to position 
themselves strategically in relation to the court (Hoehne 2016). Yet other anthropologists 
argue that anthropologists should ‘collaborate’ with courts and lawyers (Vetters & Foblets 
2016) despite clear evidence that lawyers and judges ‘instrumentalize’ anthropological 
methods by appropriating their research and knowledge (Riles 2006). While arguments about 
supposed differences in disciplinary training are no doubt correct, they completely miss the 
point: the legal system provides judges with the power to conduct a hearing and decide the 
value of all the evidence submitted to the court. In short, while experts, lawyers and judges 
may differ in terms of their methods, ethics and knowledge practices, in court these 
differences are of little consequence due to the adversarial nature of legal argument and the 
power wielded by judges. 
Finally, judges are important because they are authorised to manage and decide legal 
appeals.11 Tribunal/Court Procedural Rules and Practice Directions provide Judge’s – many 
of whom have limited training in asylum and immigration law – with considerable power to 
speedily decide appeals. Efficiency is sought by regulating legal counsel and experts and is 
 
11 Judges in different jurisdictions adopt very different approaches regarding the standard and 
burden of proof which should be applied in asylum hearings. Where as in the UK the 
standard is ‘a reasonable degree of likelihood’ that the applicant’s account is true, and their 
fear of persecution is well founded (Sivakummaran v SSHD [1998] Imm AR 147), in France 
the process hinges upon whether or not the judge develops an ‘inner belief’ regarding the 
‘truth’ of an applicant’s account based on a feeling of empathy and compassion (Kobelinsky 
2019). 
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accomplished by a judge’s use Procedural Rules and Practice Directions12 to define whose 
speech and what forms of speech are legally salient, and what weight to attach to written and 
oral evidence. ‘Good’ Immigration Judge’s (IJs) draw out a full record of the evidence and 
consider all the material ‘in the round’ including reports of country conditions and the 
relevant law; ‘skeptical’ IJs use the Procedural Rules and Practice Directions to truncate oral 
evidence enabling them to speedily refuse an appeal. Many IJs are not particularly good, a 
fact that is indicated by their overwhelming tendency to refuse large numbers of appeals on 
the basis that a claim lacks credibility (Campbell 2020; Byrne 2007; Sorgoni 2019). 
Nevertheless, if appellants have access to a good legal representative, IJ decisions are 
frequently overturned on appeal in the Upper Tribunal. 
In short, fieldwork revealed ‘a semi-autonomous social field’ that is composed of a 
diverse range of institutions and actors engaged in shaping and challenging immigration law 
and policy: this field generates its own ‘rules and customs and symbols internally, but … it is 
also vulnerable to the rules and decisions and other forces emanating from the larger world 
by which it is surrounded’ (Falk Moore 1972/73: 720). The asylum and immigration field in 
the UK is defined by its processual character. It is an empirically observable field which is 
clearly linked to other fields in complex ways and it is reinforced by the state and the 
judiciary which gives it an aura of legitimacy. A further characteristic of this social field is 
that these actors are imbued with variable professional attitudes/orientations: they are 
variously aggressive and defensive, act professionally and unprofessionally, are well- and ill-
prepared to perform their tasks and they possess quite different attitudes about asylum 
 
12 For instance, ‘Practice Direction 35’ sets out the directions which guide the way that 
experts are expected to provide evidence to the courts. For the entire list of ‘Directions’ See: 
https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules 
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seekers and migrants. In the following sections I examine how officials, lawyers, experts and 
judges perform their roles by examining four different types of legal claim. 
LITIGATION, RIGHTS AND ‘TRUTH’ 
Case 1. The contribution of expert evidence in asylum appeals 
Asylum applicants have left their country of origin and applied for political asylum in the 
United Kingdom. Asylum applicants are foreign nationals about whom many negative 
stereotypes exist, notable among them that they are ‘bogus’ and seek to enter the UK to 
access benefits, education and work. Asylum appeals are made against the Home Office’s 
initial decision to refuse an applicant protection. The Home Office refuses approximately 
ninety percent of all applications13 which triggers a right of appeal for most applicants. While 
they await a decision on their appeal they are dispersed across the UK and allocated poor 
quality housing and given food coupons. 
 
13 The initial decision is taken by a case worker and takes the form of a ‘Refusal Letter’; at 
the appeal the Home Office is represented by a junior civil servant, a Home Office Presenting 
Officer, with limited legal training. In this case the decisions taken by both officials were 
poor and contributed to the success of GA’s appeal. 
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‘GA’ was born in Ethiopia in 199814 and managed to reach the UK in 2015 when he 
applied for asylum. His case worker identified me as a recognized country expert and 
instructed me to write an Expert Report15 for his client’s 2017 appeal. 
 GA claimed that he was born in Ethiopia in 1998 to a father who was Eritrean and a 
mother who was Ethiopian, and that both of his parents were deceased. Without support he 
and his sister had lived rough on the streets and, because of their Eritrean ethnicity, they were 
discriminated against. In 2012 a stranger trafficked them to Sudan where they were 
compelled to do unpaid work; GA escaped and travelled to Libya and, via a boat, arrived in 
the UK via Italy where he claimed asylum aged seventeen.  
Home Office officials refused to grant him Discretionary Leave to Remain and they 
refused his asylum claim because they did not accept that he was an Eritrean national; instead 
they argued that he was Ethiopian and that he could claim Ethiopian nationality through his 
 
14 I was given his entire case file which contained his Home Office Statement of Evidence 
form, his initial Asylum Screening Interview, the Home Office Refusal Letter, a psychiatric 
report and other associated material. A copy of the FTT’s decision was  sent to me after the 
hearing (appeal PA/05762/2017).  
15 His case worker instructed me to address the following issues: country-background 
information on the mistreatment of ethnic Eritreans in Ethiopia; country background on the 
situation of street-children in Ethiopia as a source country of trafficking; the plausibility of 
the his account; whether he was entitled to Ethiopian nationality (and how he might 
reasonably be expected to secure it); any risk of re-trafficking if  he were to be returned to 
Ethiopia; and any other information which I felt was relevant to his claim. My curriculum 
vitae, containing evidence of research, publications and work as an expert in asylum 
proceedings was attached to the report as evidence that I was a recognized country expert. 
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mother. The Home Office also argued that if he were returned to Ethiopia, he could ‘avail 
himself of the protection’ of the authorities and would not be at risk of being re-trafficked.16 
Officials argued that since he attended school in Ethiopia, albeit for one year, he must be an 
Ethiopian national. Furthermore, he was interviewed in Amharic, an ‘Ethiopian language’, 
and provided no evidence that he could speak Tigrinya, the language spoken by his father. 
Finally, it was asserted that because he had not made ‘a bona fide’ application to the 
Ethiopian embassy to secure a travel document to Ethiopia, his claim should be refused. 
 During the hearing legal argument by GAs barrister and evidence from my Expert 
Report were relied upon to counter arguments by the Home Office. On the issue of 
nationality, my report showed that Ethiopian law did not support the argument that GA was 
entitled to Ethiopian nationality or indeed that he could access it if he were returned to 
Ethiopia. The Judge stated: ‘I must have regard to the opinions of experts when interpreting 
foreign law. I have not been referred to any contrary authority to that of Dr Campbell as to 
the appellant’s ability to acquire Ethiopian nationality…’ (¶33; my emphasis).  
My report made it clear that: (a) both parents of an individual seeking nationality must 
be Ethiopian ‘by descent’ and that being born in Ethiopia does not entitle an individual to 
Ethiopian nationality; (b) the appellant could not avail himself of Ethiopian laws promulgated 
in 2003 and 2004 to regularize the status of resident Eritreans because the registration period 
had ended; (c) viewed against relevant background evidence, the appellant’s claim that he is 
an Eritrean national was consistent and plausible; (d) seen against relevant British case law, 
the appellant had made a ‘bona fide’ application to the Ethiopian embassy which had been 
refused because he could not provide the required documentation; (e) if he were forcibly 
 
16 This argument was effectively countered by his barrister who noted that trafficking 
constituted a form of persecution. 
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returned to Ethiopia the authorities would not recognize him as a national and he would be 
imprisoned or placed in a refugee camp; finally (f) I concluded that if he were returned to 
Ethiopia, as a young adult who had no familial or social support he was vulnerable and might, 
once again, be trafficked.  
 My expert report also addressed two ‘cultural’ issues. First, I argued that GA had 
‘clearly distinguished between his ability to speak Amharic, a language spoken in Ethiopia, 
and his ethnicity, which was Tigrinya and that there is no direct relation between language 
and ethnicity. Second, I concluded that GA’s account of being a street child was ‘plausible.’ 
 The Judge accepted my evidence and decided that GA was an Eritrean national who 
could not be returned to Ethiopia; he recognized him as a refugee. The judge discounted the 
entire Home Office case against the appellant. Two points are worth making. First, with 
regard to the legal evidence provided to the court, the Home Office Presenting Officer failed 
to provide a ‘contrary authority’, i.e. rebuttal evidence, that could contest or undermine my 
evidence. This point is critical: judicial decisions depend upon weighing arguments against 
counterarguments in a process which leaves it to the judge to decide whose evidence to 
accept. It is important to recognize that the adversarial process is NOT a zero-sum game in 
which judges automatically exercise their hegemony to control experts. Second, the provision 
of evidence – legal and cultural – requires experts to carefully document their reports and 
demonstrate how they arrived at their conclusions. 
Case 2. The role of experts in ‘foreign’ adoption proceedings 
This case looks at the pivotal role of expert evidence in the adoption of foreign children in 
the UK. Adoption is one of a myriad of legal statuses defined and regulated by the United 
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Kingdom’s growing list of Immigration Rules which are designed to regulate the entry of  
foreign nationals into the UK.17 Specifically, Immigration Rule 309A states:  
‘For the purposes of adoption under paragraphs 310-316C a de facto adoption shall be 
regarded as having taken place if:  
 
(a) at the time immediately preceding the making of the application for entry 
clearance under these Rules the adoptive parent or parents have been living abroad 
(in applications involving two parents both must have lived abroad together) for at 
least a period of time equal to the first period mentioned in sub-paragraph (b)(i) 
and must have cared for the child for at least a period of time equal to the second 
period material in that sub-paragraph; and 
(b) during their time abroad, the adoptive parent or parents have: (i) lived together 
for a minimum period of 18 months, of which the 12 months immediately 
preceding the application for entry clearance must have been spent living together 
with the child; and (ii) have assumed the role of the child’s parents, since the 
beginning of the 18 month period, so that there has been a genuine transfer of 
parental responsibility. 
309B. Inter-country adoptions may be subject to section 83 of the Adoption and 
Children Act 200218 or the equivalent legislation in Scotland or Northern Ireland if 
the adopter’s habitual residence is there. Where this is the case, a letter obtained 
from the Department for Education (England and Wales habitual residents) or the 
equivalent from the relevant central authority (Scotland or Northern Ireland 
habitual residents) confirming the issue of a Certificate of Eligibility must be 
provided with any entry clearance adoption application under paragraphs 310-
316C.’ [my emphasis] 
 
British courts and Home Office Entry Clearance Officers who decide applications for 
inter-country adoption require clear evidence about foreign adoption procedures, which in 
turn requires a report from a ‘country expert’ who, per force, is required to adopt an 
interstitial position between different legal jurisdictions. This is necessary when the state 
 
17 For a list of the relevant immigration rules, see: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/immigration-
rules/immigration-rules-part-8-family-members#pt8children 
18 See: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ssi/2013/310/pdfs/ssi_20130310_en.pdf 
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from which a child is adopted is not a signatory to The Hague Convention (1980)19, i.e. where 
a recognized system of international adoption does not exist.  
‘Mekdes’ was adopted in Ethiopia by a British couple living in Abu Dhabi who 
sought to bring her to Scotland where the relevant legislation is the Adoption Recognition of 
Overseas Adoption (Scotland) Regulations 2013/310. This legislation was modified by 
Cobb J in G (Children) [2014] EWHC 2605 which sets out the common law test that requires 
three questions to be answered in order to recognize a foreign adoption: “(i) Was the adoption 
obtained wholly lawfully in the foreign country? (ii) If so, did the concept of adoption in that 
jurisdiction substantially conform with the English concept? (iii) If so, was there any public 
policy consideration that should mitigate against recognition?’ 
In 2014, following an unsuccessful approach to the Ethiopian embassy for assistance, 
a British lawyer instructed me to identify relevant foreign law and procedures in Ethiopia 
where the child was adopted from and to assess whether the child’s adoption met the 
conditions set out by the Immigration Rules/Cobb 2014. This task required me to identify and 
interpret relevant Ethiopian and British law and procedure and to writing a report for the 
Scottish Court of Sessions to confirm whether the process used by the adoptive couple 
followed the correct procedure for adoption in Ethiopia. I was also required to assess whether 
the documents which the couple submitted to the court were ‘genuine and authentic.’ 
The couple’s lawyer sent me the case bundle which contained documents identifying 
the adoptive parents and the child they wished to adopt, the death certificate of the adopted 
 
19 See: https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=24 
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child’s father20, translations and original copies of the Ethiopian adoption contract, a 
document issued by the Federal First Instance Court, a request to the Federal First Instance 
Court to issue a decision on the adoption, and the decision of the Federal First Instance Court. 
I identified the Revised Family Code of Ethiopia (1992) as the legislation regulating adoption. 
What was missing, however, was a statement from the adopted parents regarding the 
specific steps they had taken to secure adoption in Ethiopia. Their lawyer took further witness 
statements from both parents and sent them to me. My report addressed Scottish and 
Ethiopian law and established that the documents provided by the adoptive family clearly 
indicated that they had followed the procedures set out in Arts. 190, 193 and 194 of the 
Ethiopian Family Code, that they were eligible to adopt21, that the child was under the age of 
eighteen when adoption occurred, that relevant Ethiopian identity documents had been issued 
to the child in Ethiopia, and that the Browns had provided long-term support for the child 
prior to bringing her to the UK. My report concluded that Ethiopian law and policy 
conformed with Scottish law.  
The report was  submitted to the Scottish Court of Session for a decision along with 
an application for a grant and relevant affidavits from the parents. In 2015 Lord Brailsford 
sitting in the Court of Session considered the evidence before him, including my expert 
report, and recognized the common law adoption of the child. This was the first ‘foreign 
 
20 The child’s deceased father had married an Ethiopian woman; following his death the 
child’s mother married Mr. Brown, a British national and the couple were seeking to formally 
adopt her child. 
21 Unlike the situation which prevails in the UK, Ethiopian law forbids gay/homosexual 
couples and single adults from adopting children.  
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adoption’ recognized in Scottish Law22 and set the standard for the provision of expert 
evidence in subsequent inter-country adoption procedures. 
Case 3: When is a refugee not a refugee? 
The case of ‘ST’23 provides a window into the way that lawyers and judges construct 
a case and view evidence; it illustrates how a legal case was transformed from an argument 
about the facts of the case – did the Tribunal/FTT grant ‘ST’ refugee status or not – to an 
arcane point of law, namely an analysis of Art. 32 of the 1951 Refugee Convention24 that took 
lawyers and judges fourteen years to ‘decide’ during which time the asylum applicant led a 
physically, economically and legally precarious existence.  
The applicant was an Ethiopian-born ethnic Eritrean who fled Ethiopia at a time when 
that country was arresting and deporting ethnic Eritreans during a bitter war with Eritrea 
(Campbell 2014). She arrived in the UK in 1998 and claimed asylum as an Eritrean national; 
 
22 See: https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/search-judgments/judgment?id=28b7daa6-8980-69d2-
b500-ff0000d74aa7. 
23 I attended and took notes of the JR proceedings in the High Court and interviewed her 
barrister. Subsequent legal proceedings were published online. 
24 ‘Article 32, expulsion 1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their 
territory save on grounds of national security or public order. 2. The expulsion of such a 
refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with due process of 
law. Except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, the refugee 
shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be represented for 
the purpose before competent authority or a person or persons specially designated by the 
competent authority.’  
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however, the Home Office failed to assess her claim until 200425 when they refused it. She 
appealed against that decision to the FTT which, in March 2005, upheld the Home Office 
decision refusing her protection. In an appeal to the Upper Tribunal in February 2005, the UT 
decided that her case should be reconsidered due to a serious error of law made by the IJ who 
had decided to return her to Ethiopia. In January 2006 the FTT reconsidered her case and 
found that she was a refugee and granted her protection.  
Surprisingly, in May 2006, and well after the five days allowed the SSHD to appeal 
against a decision by the FTT, the Home Office issued a new refusal letter overturning the 
Tribunal’s decision. In July 2006 STs legal team filed a judicial review (JR) asking the High 
Court to overturn the Home Office decision on the basis that it was ‘unreasonable’.26 The JR, 
which substantially narrowed the grounds of appeal, was granted by the High Court in 
December 2008 which decided that the FTT had ‘made a finding’ that the applicant ‘was 
entitled to the protection of the 1951 Convention’.27 
 
25 This was period when the Home Office was in considerable turmoil and there was a 
massive backlog of cases which it failed to deal with; see: [2008] EWHC 3064 (Admin). 
26 ‘It is settled principle today, however, that judicial review for unreasonableness is not 
restricted to situations in which a public authority purports to make a decision which is not in 
accordance with the terms of the powers conferred on it and that, even if a decision on the 
face of it fails within the letter of these powers, it can still be successfully impugned if it is 
shown to be unreasonable, in the relevant sense. The essence of this broader criterion of 
unreasonableness is …that "there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could 
ever dream that it lay within the powers of the author’ (Peiris 1987: 54-55). 
27 See: https://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_HC_QB,496478cd2.html 
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However, counsel for the Home Office appealed against the High Court decision to 
the Court of Appeal which, in June 2010, reversed the decision against ST.28 In February 
2012 that CoA decision was appealed to the Supreme Court which refused the appeal against 
the Home Office on the basis that Art. 3229 of the Refugee Convention could not be given 
‘extended and autonomous meaning’ because ’ST’ was not ‘lawfully present’ in the UK as a 
refugee.30 The Supreme Court decided that ‘ST’ had been granted ‘temporary admission’ into 
the UK until such a time as her case was finally decided (cf. Sawyer & Turpin 2005). 
During the fourteen years this case wound its way through the courts the central issue 
moved away from objective evidence about whether ST would be persecuted in Eritrea or 
Ethiopia, to whether the Home Office had unreasonably delayed assessing her case and taken 
an unreasonable, and therefore illegal decision to overturn a Tribunal decision, to an arcane 
 
28 See: https://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_CA_CIV,4c1f856d2.html 
29 Art. 32 concerns ‘expulsion’ and states: ‘1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee 
lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public order. 2. The 
expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance 
with due process of law. Except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise 
require, the refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and 
be represented for the purpose before competent authority or a person or persons specially 
designated by the competent authority. 3. The Contracting States shall allow such a refugee a 
reasonable period within which to seek legal admission into another country. The Contracting 
States reserve the right to apply during that period such internal measures as they may deem 
necessary.’ 
30 See: https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2010-0149.html 
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question of law: was ‘ST’ ‘lawfully present’ in the UK.31 The case provides an excellent 
illustration of Bourdieu’s concept of the ‘judicial field’ in which lawyers contend with each 
other in lengthy litigation which ultimately went to the Supreme Court to decide the issue (in 
a process that failed to address the protection needs of ‘ST’). 
Indeed, the situation facing asylum seekers deteriorated rapidly during this period 
because the government eliminated their right work, their right to access social security and 
their ability to resist removal. This was a period when legal aid budgets were slashed, and 
more experienced lawyers stopped practicing asylum and immigration law which left asylum 
applicants with fewer options to challenge Home Office decisions.  
Case 4. The limitations of litigation and the ‘Windrush Scandal’ 
This case concerns who has the right to reside in the UK, a right which is set out in 
the Immigration Rules32 but which is very complex and varies in relation to the legal status of 
an individual. The key issue I address here concerns the extent to which litigation, in this case 
numerous successful Judicial Reviews against the Home Office, failed to force the 
Government to change its policy. Indeed, it was belated Parliamentary pressure, together with 
media reports which finally made clear how inequitable Home Office policies were, which 
put pressure on the Government to change its policies. 
 
31 Many years later her barrister remarked: ‘I very much doubt she was ever returned. To 
memory she had a husband who was either a British citizen or a refugee, and two kids.  The 
case took so long that I imagine she was ultimately given DLR [leave to remain] on a broad 
Art. 8 ECHR basis’. 
32 See: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/immigration-rules/immigration-rules-part-1-leave-to-
enter-or-stay-in-the-uk 
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The ‘Windrush’ scandal emerged in relation to new Immigration Rules created in 
201033 and the way that Home Office officials implemented these rules which were part of a 
strategy to reduce UK immigration to the levels promised by Government in the 2010 
Conservative Party Election Manifesto34 (which was given a statutory basis in the 
Immigration Act 2014). It is now widely agreed that the Governments’ ‘implacable 
opposition to immigrants’ and human rights, combined with a wilful disregard of evidence 
and of those who urged caution …’ caused untold suffering for ‘the Windrush generation, 
and all other immigrants and ethnic minorities placed in a comparable position’ (JWCI 2018: 
3). 
 In 2010, following its victory in national elections, the Conservative Party (in 
conjunction with the Liberal Democrats) put into place new and more complex immigration 
rules aimed at preventing entry into the UK by asylum seekers and migrants35 and creating 
greater ‘post-entry control’ over ‘migrants’ already in the UK (White 2019). In 2013 the 
Government was told that its ‘hostile climate’ against ‘illegal migrants’ was causing distress 
to hundreds of Caribbean migrants who were being told to leave the UK and that the 
 
33 The government introduced eight changes to the Immigration Rules in 2010, see: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/immigration-rules-statement-of-
changes#statement-of-changes-to-the-immigration-rules:-2010 
34 The pledge to cut immigration was a major plank in the party manifesto, see p. 21-f of the 
Manifesto. 
35 A migrant is a person who moves from one country to another and who is required to apply 
to the proposed host country for permission to enter and reside there. Migrants may be 
joining family already resident in the country; they may be applying to work or to study or 
for some other legally recognized reason. 
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implementation of the immigration rules was giving rise to serious legal problems. However, 
the Government carried on in the face of a growing numbers of judicial reviews. Official 
statistics on the number of Judicial Reviews filed against asylum and immigration decisions 
indicate a sharp rise to ten thousand in 2010, the year the ‘hostile policy environment’ came 
into force, rising to over fifteen thousand five hundred per year by 2013 followed by a 
decline to about four thousand claims per annum in subsequent years.36  
At least one-third of these JRs were successful (this includes cases in which the 
government ‘settled’ without going to trial; cf. Bondy & Sunkin 2009).37 In one JR 
proceeding in 2016 Lord Turnbull [2016] CSOH 73] in the Scottish House of Sessions found 
that the SSHD’s order that an applicant should leave the UK was based on an incorrect 
assessment of his right of Indefinite Leave to Remain (he entered the UK in 1959, and in 
1973 his Pakistani passport was endorsed by the Home Office granting him Indefinite Leave 
to Remain). The Home Office sought to remove him when he applied to have a new passport 
endorsed by the HO indicating his right to remain in the UK; it refused to endorse the 
passport and stated that he had lost this ‘right’ even though officials provided no evidence for 
their decision. The JR against the Home Office was granted. 
In a JR filed against NHS regulations that were introduced in 2017 which forced 
people who cannot prove UK residency to pay for their treatment in advance, ‘Albert 
Thompson’, who had legally resided in the UK for forty years, failed in his attempt to quash 
 
36 Source: Table 2.1 in ‘Civil Justice and Judicial Review Data zip file’ at: 
https://data.gov.uk/dataset/163c7366-0988-44f8-9803-6d3124311716/civil-justice-statistics 
37 See: ‘The true statistics behind judicial reviews ‘s success rates’ at: 
https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2015/03/23/the-true-statistics-behind-judicial-reviews-
success-rates/ 
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the regulations and was refused access to cancer treatment.38 The case hinged on his inability 
to provide documentation of his right to remain (though it is now clear that the Home Office 
had shredded/disposed of official documents, including the landing cards issued to Windrush 
migrants who entered the UK between 1959 and 1973). It was only when MP’s raised his 
case in Parliament that Prime Minister May was forced to announce that ‘he would get the 
treatment he needs’.39 
However, it was not until 2018 that MPs began to raise questions in Parliament about 
the immigration status of their constituents – some had been deported, some were threatened 
with deportation, some had their access to housing and health benefits removed etc. – and had 
begun to demand information from the Home Office about the human cost of its ‘hostile 
environment’ policies that the Government began to backtrack on its position. What appears 
to have sparked a growing public controversy was not litigation or growing media attention 
but demands by MPs for an investigation into the situation and their demand that Home 
Office officials should be held accountable for wrongful decisions.  
 The scale and complexity of problems which confronted the ‘Windrush Generation’  
who number at least six hundred thousand persons40 arose from a blanket denial of their civil 
 
38 See: ‘Windrush man charged for cancer treatment loses legal challenge against ‘hostile 
environment’ regulations’ (The Independent, 10 December 2018). 
39 See: ‘Albert Thompson finally given a date to receive cancer treatment’ (The Independent, 
25 April 2018). 
40 The NAO (2018: 15) observed that: ‘The Immigration Act 1971, which came into force in 
1973, introduced changes to end large-scale immigration from the Commonwealth. The Act 
preserved the indefinite leave to remain of Commonwealth citizens already living in the UK 
but from that point on people arriving from Commonwealth countries were granted 
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and human rights as a direct result of policies devised by the former Home Secretary, Teresa 
May, which were implemented by UK Visas and Immigration, Immigration Enforcement, the 
Border Force, the Department for Work and Pensions, the Driver and Vehicle Registration 
Agency and the National Health Service not to mention private organizations and individuals 
who were required to check on the right of individuals to rent accommodation. 
In 2018 The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JWCI, 5-6) outlined its 
understanding of the situation in the following terms:  
1. ‘Windrush migrants, other Commonwealth nationals, and other groups were 
turned into undocumented migrants or undocumented citizens by the creation 
of a system of immigration control, which was not accompanied by the 
creation of universal identity documents …   
2. The later introduction and, post-2012, massive expansion of outsourced 
immigration enforcement under what became known as the ‘hostile 
environment’ created most of the problems faced by Windrush nationals. The 
Hostile Environment requires businesses, public services and ordinary citizens 
to target those without documents, and its structure encourages the targeting of 
ethnic minorities and those who look or sound ‘foreign’.   
3. It requires those people to be denied access to housing, healthcare, 
employment, benefits, or assistance and encourages reporting them to the 
authorities if they attempt to access assistance such as police protection as 
victims of crime. The idea is to force those without documents into destitution 
 
temporary residence. The Department did not keep a record of those with …indefinite leave 
to remain, which was not time-limited, and it did not issue paperwork to people to confirm 
this. There was also no requirement for individuals to obtain proof of their status’. 
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and homelessness, outside of the normal protections of police, housing law, 
employment rights [so] that they ‘voluntarily’ leave the country without the 
Home Office having to spend money on enforcing their removal: hence 
‘Hostile’. Given that most people in the UK without documents have a right to 
be here, it inevitably causes huge amounts of harm to people who cannot and 
should not be termed ‘illegal’.  
4. This was combined with a focus from the highest levels of politics on denying 
visa applications and reducing net-migration at all costs which combined with 
a desire to make short term costs savings in Government, led to the following 
issues:  
(i) Extremely poor decision making  by Home Office staff who are 
underpaid, undertrained and under cultural and formal pressure to 
refuse applications; 
(ii) The removal of appeal rights from most immigration cases at a time 
when high numbers of appeals were successful;  
(iii) The introduction of out of country appeals after removal or 
deportation greatly reduced the chance of a successful appeal;  
(iv) The removal of legal aid from immigration cases;  
(v) The extraordinary rise in immigration application fees and citizenship 
fees;  
(vi) The continued rise in complexity of immigration rules and particularly 
the deliberate overcomplication of assessments made under Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights…’ [my emphasis] 
The NAO’s (2018: 17) review of how the Home Office handled ‘the Windrush 
situation’ revealed that policy enforcement resulted in the seizure/revocation of driving 
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licences, the closure of bank accounts, stopping benefit payments, individuals lost access to 
their homes, landlords refused to rent accommodation to individuals who did not have  
immigration papers, employers refused to hire individuals, and individuals were refused 
access to health care (which meant that they had to meet the full costs of health care).  The 
NAOs anodyne conclusion was that: ‘The Department had a duty of care to ensure that 
people’s rights and entitlements were recognised, and this has been re-emphasised by the 
Prime Minister. We do not consider that the Department adequately considered that duty in 
the way that it introduced immigration policy’ (p. 11).  
It was the documentation of extensive discrimination against individuals who had the 
right to remain in the UK that undermined public confidence in Home Office policies, forced 
the Home Secretary to resign, and led to a commission of inquiry into the Home Office and 
the establishment of a compensation scheme for those affected by the hostile policy 
environment. Litigation, in the form of thousands of Judicial Reviews against officials 
implementing the ‘hostile’ policies played a limited  role in changing government policy. 
Indeed, litigation can at best only address injustices experienced by individuals because, as 
White (2019: 13) has noted, the problem facing the Windrush ‘generation’ ‘is exacerbated by 
… the extraordinarily complicated changes in nationality and immigration law … rigorous 
Home Office enforcement of the policy; enforcement by private citizens … and reliance upon 
documentation created for an entirely different system.’  
In short, the supposed ‘bright line’ which is assumed to clearly differentiate between 
the rights of citizens and non-nationals was, in this case, substantially blurred if not 
obliterated by a raft of legislation beginning with the Commonwealth Immigrant Act 1962 
which, step by step and year by year, stripped away the rights of residence of Commonwealth 
Citizens. The process ended with the Immigration Act 2014 that imposed post-entry controls 
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on individuals who were legally resident in the UK, but who did not have the required 
documentation to prove their right, in an attempt to force them out of the UK. 
CONCLUSION 
While asylum and migration law and policy is supposed to draw ‘a bright line’ 
differentiating between the rights of citizens and non-nationals, in fact legislation and the 
discretionary decisions of Home Office officials have over the year blurred the line which, in 
turn, has led considerable political-legal contestation. 
 Asylum and migration litigation provides a window into how this social field 
operates. The outcome of litigation shows that Home Office policy can sometimes be 
successfully contested and that official decisions can be overturned through the work of 
lawyers who, acting as gatekeepers into this field, interview clients, prepare cases and instruct 
experts to provide evidence and barristers to litigate a case. Lawyers – this includes officials, 
private caseworkers/solicitors and barristers – define the focus of litigation, adopt a highly 
specialized legal discourse and engage in a highly adversarial system of bargaining/argument 
with each party attempting to undermine the arguments of its rival to influence the outcome 
of the case.  
 The four cases examined in this paper illustrate the interconnectedness of the 
institutions in the field which are engaged, directly and indirectly, in litigation as well as the 
different roles played by key actors. Case 1 showed that expert witnesses provide pertinent 
legal and cultural evidence to the courts, and that the key issue which determines whether 
their evidence is accepted or rejected is whether the other party in the adversarial process 
provides judges with ‘a contrary authority’ capable of undermining an expert’s evidence. 
Judges use court procedural rules and directions to assess the evidence and to decide what 
weight, if any, they should give to an expert’s opinions and the submissions of both parties.  
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 Case 2 illustrated a somewhat different role played by country experts who are 
required to identify and ‘interpret’ relevant foreign law for a British court, in this case the 
issue concerned foreign laws of adoption. Via a process of ‘simultaneous interpretation’ an 
expert situates him/herself  ‘interstitially’ between two different legal jurisdictions to provide 
evidence that can satisfy a judge that the legal requirements of British law have been met. 
Case 3 provides a good example of Bourdieu’s concept of the ‘juridical field’ in 
which lawyers argue with each other in lengthy litigation over the right to interpret the law. 
However, in the fourteen-year battle over STs claim, protection issues were side lined while 
lawyers litigated an arcane point of law.  
 Case 4 illustrates a different issue. In the face of a massive scandal created by 
iniquitous Home Office policies which were harshly implemented by officials, thousands of 
persons legally resident in the UK were discriminated against and had their lives turned 
upside down. It is clear that successful litigation – in this case judicial review which can 
provide a remedy to individuals against unreasonable official decisions – had no impact on 
official policy. Indeed, regardless of the furore over the ‘hostile policy environment’ pursued 
by the governing Conservative party, the government has still not retracted its policies, nor 
has it held officials accountable for their decisions. The Home Secretary of the day resigned, 
an inquiry was established, and limited compensation is being offered to ‘victim’s’. Even so, 
the ‘hostile’ policies have not been amended or dropped. 
 There are two principle lessons to be learned from these case studies. First, we can 
clearly appreciate the varied roles played by officials, lawyers, country experts and judges in 
the social field constituted by asylum and migration law and practice. The field is dynamic, 
and the outcome of litigation is often unpredictable. Litigation on behalf of individual 
applicants can successfully contest and overturn government decisions on asylum and 
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migration claims. However, the cases also confirm an oft-ignored element of Falk-Moore’s 
(1972/3) argument, namely that the asylum and immigration social field is ‘vulnerable to the 
rules and decisions and other forces emanating from the large world from which it is 
surrounded.’ In this case the ‘large world’ is the Home Office, an executive department of 
government which exercises an inordinate amount of power in this area of law by blocking, 
preventing or stymying litigation by individuals (Nader 2001/2). The Home Office policy 
agenda has been set by all the political parties that have governed the United Kingdom over 
the past several decades and has created a conservative political agenda with legislation 
aimed at preventing asylum seekers from entering the UK and criminalizing migrants who 
seek to enter the country or who are ‘illegally’ resident in the country.  
In deciding asylum and migration claims the judiciary has not adopted an ‘activist’ 
position aimed at overturning law or ‘rewriting’ asylum and immigration policy. In their 
analysis of cases Judges are primarily concerned with ensuring the flow of cases through the 
legal system via an intertextual analysis of case law which loses sight of the core issues in 
each case (Latour 2010). In this process, a Judge’s default position, unless challenged by 
legal counsel, is to defer to the Home Office and to arrive at decisions which maintain 
political stability and the status quo. In this sense the legal solutions available to individuals 
fail to provide an effective remedy against the state by non-nationals who ‘have no rights’ in 
British law. Indeed, even for individuals who are legally resident in the country, litigation 
might compel the Government to recognize an individual’s rights, but it cannot overturn 
inequitable policies.  
When Galanter (1974: 95) argued many years ago that ‘the basic architecture of the 
legal system creates and limits the possibilities of using the system as a means of 
redistributive (that is, systemically equalizing) change’, he had in mind the role of lawyers, in 
particular ‘repeat players’. However, litigation in asylum and immigration law faces a greater 
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uphill struggle than is the case in civil and criminal law in large part because the Home 
Office, with its access to immense resources and legal expertise, is the largest repeat player. 
In this field, the Home Office –which has secured legislation to reduce legal aid and restrict 
the right of appeal against its decisions – constrains the effectiveness of litigation as well as 
access to justice at its most basic level. Individuals deported under the ‘hostile policy 
environment’ cannot make an in-country appeal against that decision, indeed many members 
of the Windrush generation could not afford to instruct a lawyer to fight their case. In this 
sense then, the injustices suffered by individuals – many of whom possessed what should 
have been inviolable legal rights as British residents – reveals considerable injustice in the 
form of barriers to access justice, the limitations of litigation and the fact that the law upholds 
the status quo, it does not provide justice to the ‘have nots’. 
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